A critical mass for disarmament
Change, failure and fear are propelling us
toward a world without nuclear weapons.
By Joseph Cirincione
June 4, 2008
Speaking to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on March 26, Sen.
John McCain surprised many listeners when he said that "the United
States should lead a global effort at nuclear disarmament."
It has been a long time since a Republican candidate for president said
anything close to this, let alone seemed to think it would help him win
election. But McCain senses what many may have not: This is a rare
moment in national and international politics, a period of rapid change
that promises a transformation in global nuclear policy.
This transformation is the result of four converging factors. The first
is the deep and ongoing concern about existing nuclear threats. These
threats include the possibility that a terrorist group might get hold
of a nuclear weapon; the fact that there are still 26,000 existing
nuclear weapons held by nine nations today; the efforts of a few
countries -- most prominently Iran and North Korea -- to develop their
own nuclear weapons for the first time; and the possible collapse of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime triggering a cascade of
proliferation.
The second factor is the widespread sense, among policymakers and the
public, that existing U.S. policies have failed to lessen these
dangers. President Bush sought to maintain U.S. supremacy through a
reduced but still large nuclear arsenal, new nuclear weapons (like his
"nuclear bunker buster" or the artfully dubbed "reliable replacement
warhead"), rejection of treaties limiting U.S. freedom of action and
preemptive military action against hostile states. But nuclear threats
only increased as confidence in American leadership decreased.
Third (and in response to this policy collapse), there is a new drive
for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This once utopian
dream (held a few decades ago only by those on the left of the foreign
policy mainstream) is now the focus of a bipartisan appeal from
Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and Democrats William
Perry and Sam Nunn in two Wall Street Journal Op-Ed articles for "A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons." They are not alone. The foundation I
lead funds dozens of institutes working on plans for sweeping change in
nuclear policy, including the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Monterey Institute for International Studies and the Physicians for
Social Responsibility.
Finally -- and this is what may make it all come together at last --
there is a nearly simultaneous leadership turnover in most of the
world's major nations, creating openings for new leaders less rigidly
wed to the failed policies of the past. By early 2009, four of the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, seven members of the
G-8 and a number of other major states will have installed new
executives. Among them: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, Pakistan, South Korea, Britain, the United States and possibly
Israel and Iran.
Together, these factors offer an extraordinary opportunity to advance
new policies that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of
the dangers that have kept political leaders and security officials
worried about a nuclear 9/11.
How extraordinary? Consider this: The drive to reduce and eliminate
nuclear weapons comes from the very center of America's security elite.
The conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where
Shultz and Perry are both scholars, is the epicenter of this nuclear
policy earthquake. Of the 24 former national security advisors and
secretaries of State and Defense who are still living, 17 have endorsed
the Hoover campaign for a series of practical steps leading toward
nuclear abolition.
They favor deep reductions in our and others' nuclear arsenals, as well
as a complete ban on nuclear tests and on the production of bomb
materials. They've also called for the rapid securing of all bomb
materials to prevent nuclear terrorism and taking U.S. and Russian
missiles off hair-trigger alert so a president has more than 15 minutes
to decide if he should initiate Armageddon.
These former officials -- including former Republican Cabinet members
from every administration going back to President Nixon -- recognize
that the current strategy has not worked.
The clearest failure is the Iraq war. The war was the prototype for
what the Bush administration hoped would be ongoing U.S. policy: the
use of military means to stop proliferation preemptively. Bush said on
its eve, "Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final
proof -- the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud."
But there was no Iraqi nuclear weapons program -- and there were no
chemical or biological weapons either -- and the war, in the end,
actually provoked Iran and North Korea to accelerate their
programs. Both have made more progress in the last five years than in
the previous 10.
The idea that we and our allies could keep our nuclear weapons and
simultaneously prevent others from getting them also proved bankrupt.
While opposing, correctly, nuclear efforts in Iran, the Bush
administration blessed, incorrectly, the nuclear weapons program in
nearby India with a special trade deal and looked the other way while
Pakistan continued work on its bomb program and nuclear trade until it
was too obvious to ignore.
Indeed, the most dangerous country in the world today is not our
adversary Iran, which is still five to 10 years from a nuclear
capability, but our ally Pakistan. Its unstable government, growing
mountain of nuclear weapon material and tolerance of Al Qaeda bases
within its territory give Osama bin Laden the best chance he has ever
had of acquiring the nuclear weapon he seeks.
This is one reason realists like Kissinger have concluded that we must
turn "the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical
enterprise among nations." This policy is in tune with the American
people, with 70% favoring nuclear elimination in polls. McCain has now
adopted some of the new policies; Sen. Barack Obama has embraced the
entire plan, including his pledge to secure all loose nuclear materials
-- thus preventing nuclear terrorism -- in his first term.
We cannot know for certain if these plans will work. But we do know
these policy moments do not last long. As quickly as they open, they
close. The next two to three years will tell if the leaders we elect
will have the wisdom and courage to make the change they promise and
the people desire. We may not get another chance.
Joseph Cirincione is the president of Ploughshares Fund and the author
of "Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons."
Copyright 2008 Los Angeles Times