From the Los Angeles Times
Al Qaeda said to focus on WMDs
A key operative and chemical engineer who was
reported to have been slain is alive and leading the effort, officials
say.
By Josh Meyer
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
February 3, 2008
WASHINGTON —
After a U.S. airstrike leveled a small compound in Pakistan's lawless
tribal regions in January 2006, President Pervez Musharraf and his
intelligence officials announced that several senior Al Qaeda
operatives had been killed, and that the top prize was an elusive
Egyptian who was believed to be a chemical weapons expert.
But
current and former U.S. intelligence officials now believe that the
Egyptian, Abu Khabab Masri, is alive and well -- and in charge of
resurrecting Al Qaeda's program to develop or obtain weapons of mass
destruction.
Given the problems with previous U.S. intelligence
assessments of weapons of mass destruction, officials are careful not
to overstate Al Qaeda's capabilities, and they emphasize that there is
much they don't know because of the difficulty in getting information
out of the mountainous area of northwest Pakistan where the network has
reestablished itself.
But they say Al Qaeda has regenerated at
least some of the robust research and development effort that it lost
when the U.S. military bombed its Afghanistan headquarters and training
camps in late 2001, and they believe it is once again trying to develop
or obtain chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons
to use in attacks on the United States and other enemies.
For
now, the intelligence officials believe, that effort is largely focused
on developing and using cyanide, chlorine and other poisons that are
unlikely to cause the kind of mass-casualty attack that is usually
associated with weapons of mass destruction.
Intelligence
officials say they base their current assessments on anecdotal evidence
gleaned from electronic intercepts, information provided by informants
and captured Al Qaeda members and the tracking of money flows and
militant websites. One international counter-terrorism official said
there were indications that some operatives had received immunizations
to protect themselves against biological agents.
Abu Khabab,
whose real name is Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, is believed to have set
up rudimentary labs with at least a handful of aides, and to have
provided a stable environment in which scientists and researchers can
experiment with chemicals and other compounds, said several former
intelligence officials familiar with Al Qaeda's weapons program.
Recent
intelligence shows that Abu Khabab, 54, is training Western recruits
for chemical attacks in Europe and perhaps the United States, just as
he did when he ran the "Khabab Camp" at Al Qaeda's sprawling Darunta
training complex in Afghanistan's Tora Bora region before the Sept. 11
attacks, according to one senior U.S. intelligence official, who spoke
on condition of anonymity because the CIA's intelligence is classified.
Some experts questioned how far Al Qaeda could get in reconstituting a
weapons program in the mountains of Pakistan.
"They
are hemmed in in a way that makes it hard to do," said John V.
Parachini, a senior analyst on terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction at Rand Corp. "It's hard to get the industrial
infrastructure together to do these things, and it's hard to get people
that have the expertise to fashion these materials into weapons of mass
destruction."
Several international counter-terrorism officials
concurred with the U.S. intelligence assessment of Al Qaeda's weapons'
effort. Raphael Perl, who heads the Action Against Terrorism Unit of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said it is
widely assumed that Al Qaeda developed chemical weapons years ago, and
that if it doesn't have biological capabilities already, "they are
certainly not far from it."
Given that Abu Khabab "has the
technical knowledge," he said, "it's very, very clear that they are
working both in the chemical and biological fields."
Pakistani
Information Minister Nisar Memon refused to comment on Abu Khabab and
Al Qaeda's weapons program, but security officials from three Pakistani
intelligence agencies, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed
that he is alive.
The senior U.S. intelligence official
described Al Qaeda's effort as "a very small, very compartmented
program, and not nearly on the scale of what they had going on in
Afghanistan, because you don't have the size, the security, you don't
have the ease of movement" that the Taliban government provided.
Chris
Quillen, a former CIA analyst specializing in Al Qaeda's pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, said the network's program in Pakistan
could have made significant progress without authorities knowing about
it by operating in small compounds, as it did in Afghanistan.
"I
am not saying the programs are great and ready for an attack tomorrow,"
said Quillen, who left the agency in August 2006 and is now a U.S.
government intelligence contractor. "But whatever they lost in the 2001
invasion, they are back to that level at this point."
That is a
source of major frustration at the CIA, which a few years back
identified at least 40 people that it wanted to kill, capture or
question about their suspected involvement in Al Qaeda's weapons
program, Quillen and others said. They said at least half of those
suspects remain at large.
Abu Khabab's ties to terrorism date
to at least the mid-1980s, when he was a prominent member of the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization led by Ayman Zawahiri, who merged
the group with Al Qaeda. Over the years he has trained hundreds of
fighters at Al Qaeda's camps on how to use explosives, poisons and
rudimentary chemical weapons, according to FBI documents.
Educated
in Egypt as a chemical engineer, Abu Khabab has no formal training in
biological or nuclear weapons, intelligence officials say. But he has
ended up in charge of the weapons program at least in part because some
operatives believed to be more knowledgeable about biological and
nuclear weapons have been captured or killed.
Abu Khabab was
described by several intelligence officials as a cranky, showboating
self-promoter as well as one of its top explosives experts. He has had
a stormy relationship with the two top Al Qaeda leaders, Osama bin
Laden and Zawahiri, and their top command, in part because of his ego
and independent streak, those current and former intelligence officials
said.
Nevertheless, Zawahiri tapped Abu Khabab in 1999 to head
an unconventional weapons program code-named "Al Zabadi," Arabic for
fermented milk. Within months, he had made "significant progress,"
according to Al Qaeda computer files found after the U.S.-led invasion
of Afghanistan.
U.S. authorities found materials at the
Darunta complex and elsewhere in Afghanistan that showed that Al Qaeda
was aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear and biological devices, and that it was only a few years away
from developing an anthrax weapon. By 2002, Abu Khabab is believed to
have fled to Chechnya or the Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia to resume
training militants in the use of chemical weapons, before ending up in
Pakistan.
In December 2002, Al Qaeda allegedly dispatched a strike team to New
York to use a device called a mubtakkar --
or "invention" -- to disperse cyanide gas in subway cars, potentially
killing dozens of people, the senior intelligence official said.
Several officials said they suspect Abu Khabab played a role in its
development.
But Zawahiri scuttled the plot, saying, "We have
something better in mind," former CIA Director George Tenet wrote in
his 2007 autobiography. Five years later, the U.S. government still
does not know what "better" device Zawahiri was referring to, said
Quillen and the senior U.S. intelligence official.
Abu Khabab
also developed "contact poisons" that could be rubbed on a doorknob or
some other common area, and experimented with adding crushed glass to
the mixture to help get it into a potential victim's bloodstream, a
former WMD case officer at the CIA said.
In recent years, Abu
Khabab also began lobbying for more funding to pursue what he claimed
would be a successful program to build a nuclear device, according to
the former CIA officer and other U.S. officials familiar with the
intelligence.
"He has for years told Al Qaeda that he could do
it, 'Just give me the money,' " said the former CIA officer, who spoke
on the condition of anonymity because of rules preventing former agency
officials from discussing details of specific cases. "He's full of
crap. He can't. But he can certainly build a good RDD" -- a
radiological dispersal device.
Also known as "dirty bombs,"
radiological dispersal devices have conventional explosives wrapped
around radioactive material. When detonated, they can cause some
injuries, and potentially widespread contamination and tremendous
psychological and economic damage.
In June 2004, the U.S.
government had tracked Abu Khabab to Pakistan and issued a $5 million
reward for information leading to his capture. The wanted poster said
he had been distributing training manuals for making chemical and
biological weapons.
In January 2006, U.S. officials caught
wind of a purported meeting in Damadola, near the Afghanistan border,
that Abu Khabab and other senior Al Qaeda operatives, maybe even
Zawahiri, were to attend.
The CIA fired Hellfire missiles from
Predator drones at the site, killing as many as 18 people, including at
least 13 civilians. Soon after, Musharraf said a son-in-law of Zawahiri
and Abu Khabab were among the dead.
Despite Musharraf's claims,
the CIA concluded several months later that Abu Khabab was alive, based
on evidence from human intelligence and electronic intercepts of
conversations in which people talked about him in present tense.
The
CIA dispatched additional agents into northwest Pakistan in the summer
of 2006, including one specifically responsible for finding Abu Khabab,
who officials believe had gone deep into hiding, communicating only by
courier.
"I and many other CIA people considered [him]
particularly dangerous, given his portfolio for Al Qaeda," said Arthur
Keller, one CIA case officer sent to the tribal areas to track Al
Qaeda.
"I would have been happy to help him on his way to
paradise by any available means," said Keller, who left the CIA later
that year, "but the opportunity never arose."
Copyright 2008 Los Angeles Times