latimes.com

Hezbollah Is Nobody's Puppet
If the Bush administration thinks this is a proxy war, it's making a tragic mistake.
By Reza Aslan
REZA ASLAN is a research associate at USC's Center for Public Diplomacy and the author of "No god but God."

July 25, 2006

ALL ALONG the avenues of Beirut's southern suburbs, posters depict Hezbollah's fiery spiritual leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, flanked by Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Dome of the Rock often gleaming in the background. The images give the impression that these three avatars of Islamic power have formed some kind of "axis" to wrest control of the Holy Land from Israel.

It is no wonder that the Western powers assume Damascus and Tehran are responsible for the machinations of Hezbollah. After all, Iran created Hezbollah in 1982, and Iran and Syria continue to have enormous influence over the organization, not least because they provide it with hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid. But it would be a grave exaggeration to claim, as the White House repeatedly has, that Hezbollah is merely a puppet of Syria and Iran.

Over the last few years, Hezbollah has achieved enormous political success in Lebanon by transforming itself from an agent of foreign regimes into an agent of domestic reform. Hezbollah made it to parliament on a political platform focused solely on nationalist politics. Its candidates advocate civic duty and responsible governance over theology or the imposition of Islamic law. This is partly because of smart campaigning, as the Lebanese are among the most secularized people in the Arab world. But the truth is that Hezbollah has never advocated a pan-nationalist ideology. Though created by Shiite Iran and sustained by Arab Syria, it has eschewed any pan-Arabist, pan-Islamist or even pan-Shiite ties. Hezbollah has provided no significant military, financial or even spiritual assistance to its Shiite brethren in Iraq.

True, when Syria was forced out of Lebanon after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah rallied in support of its ally and patron. Yet what was most remarkable about that rally was not its pro-Syrian sentiments but its brazen display of Lebanese nationalism. The half a million Hezbollah supporters who flooded into Beirut in March 2005 were draped in the colors of Lebanon, not Syria. And since Syria's withdrawal, Hezbollah has continued to advocate protecting Lebanese territory and working across religious and sectarian lines to promote Lebanese unity, even forming a political partnership with Christian leader Michel Aoun.

The point is that despite its terrorist tactics, Hezbollah has successfully recast itself as a legitimate political party. It is unlikely that it would risk that popular support by seeming to favor its foreign benefactors to the detriment of its domestic constituents. That is why the Bush administration is so misguided in suggesting that Hezbollah's incursion into northern Israel was carried out at the behest of either Syria, which sought to stir up trouble in the region, or Iran, which wanted to divert international attention from its disputed nuclear program. All politics — even Islamist politics — are local. One need look no further than the internal dynamics of Lebanon to understand why Hezbollah would so recklessly cross the border and attack Israeli troops.

Lebanon's liberation from Israeli occupation and Syrian meddling had made obsolete Hezbollah's self-proclaimed role as the nation's protector against Israeli aggression. Israel's incursion into Gaza provided Hezbollah the perfect opportunity to demonstrate its continuing relevance as an armed militia. Of course, one can argue that Hezbollah's foolish mission was a tactical error that will erode its support in both Lebanon and the wider Arab world. Indeed, the criticism of Hezbollah pouring out of Arab capitals may signal that the militia grossly overplayed its hand.

But Hezbollah is likely to come out of this conflict with Israel even stronger than before. If there is one constant in this unstable region, it is that Israel can usually be trusted to respond to threats to its sovereignty with exaggerated force. The sustained bombing of Lebanon's airport, bridges, homes, ports, broadcast towers, electrical plants, lighthouses — even a milk factory — has wiped away the memory of many Lebanese about who started this fight in the first place, and it has once again focused the rage of the region on an aggressive Israel. Nasrallah could not have scripted events any better.

All of this is not to suggest that Syria and Iran are not playing a significant role in the current conflict. Both Assad and Ahmadinejad have plenty to gain from the escalation of violence in the region. But it is irresponsible for the West to claim that because Syria and Iran started this war, they must stop it. In the meantime, hundreds of innocent lives have been lost on both sides, and Lebanon's civilian infrastructure is once again being reduced to rubble.

This is not a proxy war, at least not yet. But without international intervention and the imposition of an immediate cease-fire, what began as a regional conflict between Israel and Lebanon could quickly become a bloody, uncontainable war with devastating consequences. And that would benefit extremists far beyond Syria and Iran.