'Your Iraq plan?' is a pointless
question
Candidates should acknowledge that Bush's war
is a failure and look beyond Iraq.
By Andrew J. Bacevich
ANDREW J. BACEVICH is a professor of history and international
relations at Boston University. He is the author of "The New American
Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War."
April 9, 2007
FOR TODAY'S presidential candidates, the question is unavoidable: What
is your plan for Iraq?
In interviews and town hall meetings, on talk shows and at fundraisers,
Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, Mitt Romney and Rudolph W.
Giuliani and all the others aspiring to succeed President Bush confront
a battery of Iraq questions: Are you for the surge or against it? If
the surge fails, what's your Plan B? How will you help the troops win?
How will you get the troops out?
However sincere, such questions
are also pointless. To pose them is to invite dissembling. The truth is
that next to nothing can be done to salvage Iraq. It no longer lies
within the capacity of the United States to determine the outcome of
events there. Iraqis will decide their own fate. We are spectators,
witnesses, bystanders caught in a conflagration that we ourselves, in
an act of monumental folly, touched off.
The questions that ought to be asked now — but so far have not been —
are of a different order.
Recall
that Bush saw Baghdad not as the final destination of his global war on
terror but as a point of departure. He imagined that liberating Iraq
might trigger a flowering of Arab democracy. He was counting on Saddam
Hussein's ouster to jump-start a regional transformation. He expected a
forthright demonstration of U.S. military might to enhance America's
standing across the Muslim world, with friend and foe alike thereafter
deferring to Washington.
None of that has come to pass. Baghdad
has become a cul-de-sac. Having plunged into a war he cannot win, Bush
will not relent. Iraq consumes his presidency because the president
wills that it should. He has become Captain Ahab: His identification
with his war is absolute.
As a consequence, the "global" effort
aimed at eliminating Islamic terror, launched back in September 2001,
has narrowed in scope. Today the global war is global in name only. In
reality, it has become a war for Mesopotamia.
For his part, the
president increasingly preoccupies himself with tactics at the expense
of statecraft. Much as Lyndon Johnson once reviewed lists of targets to
be bombed in Hanoi, Bush now ponders how many brigades will be needed
to impose order on a handful of neighborhoods around Baghdad.
Ritualistic
allusions to freedom as the antidote to terrorism still occasionally
crop up in presidential speeches, but rhetoric no longer translates
into action. An administration that once touted its expansive and
principled approach to preventing another 9/11 has abandoned principle.
Now there is only Iraq and the effort to ensure that today's news out
of Baghdad isn't any worse than yesterday's.
Our political
attention, then, needs to turn to whether the president's would-be
successors can do what Bush cannot: acknowledge our failure in Iraq and
look beyond it.
Candidates who still find merit in an open-ended
global war on terror should explain how we prevail in such an
enterprise. Given the lessons of Iraq, what exactly does it mean to
wage such a global war? Where can we expect to fight next, and against
whom? What will victory look like?
Candidates who, in light of
Iraq, have become skeptical of open-ended global war as a response to
violent Islamic radicalism should be pressed to describe their
alternative. How do they define the threat? How do they propose to deal
with it? Will they isolate it? Contain it? Subvert it? Relying on what
means and at what costs?
"What's your plan for Iraq?" was the
right question back in 2002 and 2003 — although it went largely unasked
and almost completely unanswered then. But as we approach the 2008
presidential election, though the tragedy of Iraq continues to unfold,
that question is moot.
The one that matters is this: As
President Bush departs and leaves the United States bereft of a
coherent strategy, what should fill that void?
Copyright 2007 Los Angeles Times