ROSA BROOKS
Rosa Brooks: Hillary Hits Bottom
Clinton ought to know the serious legal
ramifications of allowing torture in 'ticking bomb' scenarios.
Rosa Brooks
October 20, 2006
HAS HILLARY CLINTON been watching too many episodes of "24," or is she
just determined to prove that she really is entirely without principles?
Whichever
it is, Clinton hit a new low last week, telling the New York Daily News
that the president should have "some lawful authority" to use torture
or other "severe" interrogation methods in a so-called ticking-bomb
scenario.
These comments appear to directly contradict her
previous statements on the Military Commissions Act, which President
Bush signed into law Tuesday. In late September, Clinton objected that
the bill "undermines the Geneva Conventions by allowing the president
to issue executive orders to redefine what are permissible
interrogation techniques. Have we fallen so low as to debate how much
torture we are willing to stomach?"
It sure looks that way.
The
ticking-bomb scenario has routinely been used to justify the
legalization of torture in exceptional circumstances. This is how the
argument goes: You capture the terrorist who has just placed a nuclear
bomb somewhere in a major American city. If you can't locate and disarm
the bomb, millions of people will die. If the terrorist won't talk,
should you torture him until he tells you what you want to know?
When
you put it that way, of course, few of us would decline to torture the
terrorist. In a utilitarian sense, it's surely better to torture one
bad guy than to allow the deaths of millions of innocents, right?
But
though ticking-bomb scenarios pack an emotional wallop, such fictional
scenarios are useless — and profoundly misleading — when it comes to
making real-world decisions.
In the real world, the issue isn't whether torture might be
morally justifiable in some exceedingly rare situations. The issue is
whether it's wise, in a democratic society, to invite the government to
pass laws or issue regulations outlining the circumstances in which
torture would be justified.
The operative phrase here is
"slippery slope." In real life — as opposed to the world of "24" —
government officials generally don't know for sure if they've captured
the right person.
And they're even less likely to know for sure
whether a particular detainee possesses information that could thwart
an imminent attack on millions of people.
In real life,
interrogations are often fishing expeditions. Detainees might have
critical information, but they might not. Do you torture or mistreat
them when you're not completely sure? How much certainty do you need?
How many lives must be at stake before torture is justified: 10
million, 10,000, 10, One?
And exactly what kinds of
interrogation methods are justified? If a terror suspect won't talk
even when tortured, can you up the pressure by torturing his wife too?
How about killing his children, or ordering the slaughter of every
member of his immediate family? Such tactics might get him to cough up
the information — and hey, from a utilitarian perspective, aren't they
justified in the interests of saving millions of lives?
But … do
you really want to see U.S. law outlining exactly how many atrocities
can be committed against how many people to — maybe — save a certain
number of other people?
Make no mistake — logically, that's
where the ticking-bomb scenario takes you. Clinton insists that she
wasn't really saying that torture should be legal — no, no, of
course not. She still thinks that torture is immoral, ineffective and
counterproductive. It's just that for an "improbable but possible
eventuality" such as a true ticking-bomb scenario, she thinks that we
should make "a very, very narrow exception within very, very limited
circumstances."
And this wouldn't undermine the Geneva
Convention? You'd better believe that countries such as Syria, North
Korea and Iran would also just love to carve out some "very, very
narrow exceptions" to treaties banning torture.
CLINTON
OUGHT to know better. Plenty of immoral things might conceivably be
justified in far-fetched hypothetical situations, but that doesn't mean
the law should bless those exceptions in advance.
Take
treason. Is it possible to construct far-fetched hypothetical
situations in which treason might be justified? Sure. If one were faced
with a choice between betraying one's country and allowing the Earth to
be destroyed, treason might well be morally justified. But that doesn't
mean we should pass laws laying out the conditions under which treason
would be permissible.
Or how about rape? If torture can be
justified by utilitarian principles, then in some "very, very limited
circumstances," rape can presumably be justified as well. Would Clinton
— would any American — truly want to see legislation laying out
the unique circumstances in which rape should be permitted?
No. We really, really don't want to go there.
Clinton
was right about one thing: When you start to contemplate writing those
"very, very narrow" exceptions into law, you've fallen as low as it's
possible to go.
Copyright 2006 Los Angeles Times