From the Los Angeles Times
Radical Iraqi Cleric Expands His Reach
Sadr
rules much of the Shiite street and parts of the government. U.S.
officials see his clout as a potential threat to the new regime.
By Borzou Daragahi
Times Staff Writer
March 13, 2006
SADR CITY, Iraq — Muqtada Sadr's expanding web of power starts right
here, on the teeming streets of a neighborhood in northeastern Baghdad
named after his assassinated father and uncle.
It
begins with charities and public services, such as subsidized cooking
fuel, street cleaning and soccer games for the aimless boys of the
Shiite Muslim ghetto.
It extends to neighborhood watch groups
and his Al Mahdi militiamen, who control and secure Sadr City as well
as southern cities such as Basra, sometimes menacing rival Shiite
groups, U.S.-led forces and, more recently, Sunni Arab neighborhoods.
It
has spread to Iraq's parliament, where the young anti-U.S. cleric's
followers control a key 35-seat bloc that has boosted interim Prime
Minister Ibrahim Jafari's political fortunes, and to provincial
councils and local police forces in the Shiite south, where militiamen
serve as a kind of morality police.
It stretches through key
ministries such as transportation and health, which have become vast
patronage troves for Sadr's followers. And it has grown beyond Iraq's
borders: Sadr has spent the last few months circling the region as he
rides a wave of tremendous popular support unique among any of the
political movements that have emerged in Iraq since Saddam Hussein was
ousted.
Three years ago, the U.S. invaded Iraq at least in part,
the White House says, to unleash the nation's democratic potential. By
deftly employing gun and ballot alike, Sadr has used the chaos of the
postwar period to spread his movement's power day by day — and,
startlingly, transform himself from obscure young rabble-rouser to
hunted rebel to statesman.
Sadr's status has alarmed U.S.
officials hoping to wind down the American presence and leave behind a
stable government. U.S. and Iraqi officials worry that his movement,
with its arsenal of weapons and radical ideology, poses a threat to any
central authority and inspires other political movements to take up
arms.
"The true nightmare in Iraq is not Anbar," the province
that is the hotbed of the Sunni-led insurgency, "it's Basra," said a
high-level U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "It's
neighborhood by neighborhood, police station by police station,
collectives of quasi-political, quasi-criminal gangs, who may use a
label that has a national color to it but in reality isn't national at
all.
"And it's the intermingling of criminality and the push for individual
power, all blended into one."
"Muqtada!
Muqtada!" chant thousands of faithful who gather for Friday prayers in
Sadr City, in frequent rowdy street rallies, during religious
ceremonies where older crowds blush at the sight of Sadr's young male
followers jumping up and down and swiveling their hips. "Yes, yes,
Muqtada!"
Electricity courses through the crowds of his
followers in Sadr City, the milieu of energetic Iraqi youth. They play
soccer in dusty fields of a district that has become a national gold
mine of talented professional athletes. They volunteer for street
cleanup operations and donate blood after Friday prayers. They carry
grenade launchers and AK-47s as they patrol the neighborhood as part of
his Al Mahdi army.
"We do all the services for the people, all
the humanitarian work," said Kareem Jorani, a member of the militia.
"Whatever people need, we provide. We protect them at night. We provide
security for the people."
Others in Baghdad call Sadr City residents "shuruqi,"
or easties, a derogatory term referring to the capital's poor eastern
edge as well as the predominantly Shiite southeast of the country that
was brutally suppressed by Hussein.
The young Sadr, somewhere between his mid-20s and mid-30s, has turned "shuruqi"
into an emblem of pride, a rallying cry of a defiant movement forged in
mosques as well as the battlefield.
Sadr
inherited control of the Martyr Sadr foundation, the network of mosques
and charities throughout the country's Shiite areas funded by donations
from the millions of followers of the Sadr clerical line, after the
fall of Hussein's government.
But his benevolent efforts
aside, violence has been a part of Sadr's legacy and a tool for his
advancement since he announced the creation of his Al Mahdi army in the
summer of 2003, quickly turning it into an impromptu force of thousands
of young men. Because the militia is informally organized, its strength
today is unknown.
Fighting broke out between Al Mahdi militiamen
and U.S. forces in the spring of 2004. The militiamen surprised
Americans with their tenacity. By the time the battles ended in the
autumn of 2004, the militiamen had fought the Americans to near
standstills.
Sadr's forces suffered heavy losses, and incurred
heavy damage to Valley of Peace cemetery in Najaf, his hometown and the
site of the shrine of Imam Ali and some of the faith's most important
seminaries.
The people of Najaf and the nearby shrine city of
Karbala, mostly loyal to more moderate clerics such as Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani, grew to despise Sadr.
But his battle scars and
vehement denunciations of U.S. and British forces bolstered his
nationalist credentials to followers and demonstrated to a ruling class
of mostly exiled politicians his capacity to use his militiamen to
bring the political process to a halt.
Senior clergy in both
Iraq and Iran pressed him to join a coalition with other Shiite parties
in two parliamentary elections last year.
Sadr played it both
ways, criticizing the elections while allowing his followers to run as
either independents or on the main Shiite slate. He now controls more
seats in the 275-seat legislature than any other political leader.
When
it came time to dole out ministries, Sadr asked for and got the
ministries of transportation, with control over ports, roadways and
motor vehicle licensing; and health, with at least 150,000 employees;
and began handing out jobs to followers.
"The Mahdi army of
Iraq is at the service of the Iraqi people," Sadr said in an interview
last month on Al Jazeera TV. "The Mahdi army was at a time a military
army, but now it has become a cultural army. In the past the fight was
a military one. Now the conflict is a religious one."
Still,
Al Mahdi's paramilitary operations continue apace. Among Sadr's crowd,
guns and ammunition are always close at hand. Young Mahdi militiamen
toting Kalashnikovs and wearing flak jackets direct traffic and check
cars in Sadr City. Inside Sadr offices, militiamen monitor radios and
cellphones. An agent was recently overheard calling an Al Mahdi army
office to report a suspicious car entering the neighborhood.
"Follow him," a commander ordered over a cellphone.
Black-shirted
Al Mahdi militiamen are largely believed to be responsible for February
attacks on Sunni Arab mosques and clerics after the bombing of a Shiite
shrine in Samarra.
For days, Sunni Arab leaders and television
stations gave horrifying accounts of "black shirts" marauding through
Sunni neighborhoods and abducting young men.
"This is the point
of danger in the Sadr movement," said Isam Arrawi, a hard-line Sunni
Arab nationalist and member of the Muslim Scholars Assn., a clerical
umbrella group. "Furious masses, in the absence of good thinking, did
unspeakable things."
Sadr denied that his followers were
responsible for the carnage. In response to the chaos, he adopted a
moderate tone and ordered his followers to stop wearing black. They
complied, and now mostly wear street clothes.
Sadr's followers
enforce not only security but a fairly harsh Islamic fundamentalism. On
university campuses, Al Mahdi army adherents order women to cover their
heads. They have intimidated liquor store owners. Last year in Basra,
the militiamen stormed through a coed picnic beating unveiled women.
But
even Iraqis who loathe Sadr's fundamentalism welcome his movement's
efforts to guard mosques and religious ceremonies and act as a force of
order, if not law. In the rest of the capital and much of the rest of
the country, Iraqis cower in their homes, their neighborhoods moribund
caldrons of fear and despair. Sadr City and cities of the south buzz
with frenetic activity, protected by armed militiamen. Pedestrians and
cars jostle for space below huge portraits of the young Sadr and his
famous father, Mohammed Sadeq Sadr, and uncle, Mohammed Bakr Sadr, both
believed to have been slain by Hussein's forces.
"The
government cannot protect us because they are infiltrated and
corrupted," said Ghasem Khalidi, a 40-year-old employee at the Ministry
of Industry from Basra and follower of the moderate cleric Sistani.
"The governmental forces are made up of different militias who each
seek the interests of their own political parties."
With control
over so-called service ministries, Sadr's followers have been able to
deliver improvements denied other Iraqis. Sadr City's streets, ravaged
by neglect and by bombs planted by Al Mahdi militiamen in the 2004
uprising against the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division, have been
repaired.
The whole 8-square-mile neighborhood of up to 2 1/2
million people stands in stark contrast to the rest of the capital.
Lime-green saplings have been planted in main squares, part of a rare
beautification effort. The stench of raw sewage, which last year
overwhelmed warrens of densely packed residential alleyways, has
dissipated, signs of progress for which both U.S. officials and Al
Mahdi members take credit.
"We diverted resources from Sunni
neighborhoods and rich Shiite neighborhoods to our neighborhood," said
Hatem Adhad Mohammed, 41, a municipal worker and Sadr loyalist.
As
the influence and presence of secular Iraqi politicians such as former
Pentagon favorite Ahmad Chalabi and former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi
wane, Sadr's domestic and international political credibility swell.
U.N. chief envoy Ashraf Jehangir Qazi and most of Iraq's most important
politicians have begun visiting the cleric.
Sadr has often
traveled to Iran, where he maintains ties with both the political
leadership in Tehran and senior clergy in the seminary city of Qom. But
he has expanded his regional itinerary, meeting with leaders in Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.
Unsettled by Sadr's threats and
distracted by an ongoing Sunni Arab insurgency, U.S. and Iraqi
officials have allowed his movement to gather steam, with his deputies
turning segments of the government into patronage machines and his
militia turning sections of the country into fiefdoms.
Officials acknowledge the perils involved in his rise.
"It
is not an acceptable answer to succumb to the presence of a militia to
protect a particular neighborhood or a city's security," said a Western
diplomat in Baghdad who specializes in Iraq's military affairs but
spoke on condition of anonymity. "Militias are not loyal to a body
politic, or to a constitution, or to a nationally elected set of
leaders. A militia's loyalty is to one particular ethnic-sectarian
group. They're not accountable to the rule of law."
*
A special correspondent in Basra contributed to this
report.
Copyright 2006 Los Angeles Times